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In Tuer v. McDonald, 347 Md. 507, 701 A.2d 1101 (1997), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that a change in medical protocol 
was inadmissible under Maryland 
Rule 5-407 as evidence of a 
subsequent remedial measure. 
Specifically, the court denied the 
plaintiffs contentions that defense 
testimony challenged the feasibility 
of the new protocol or placed the 
testimony at issue for 
impeachment purposes. The court 
ruled that the testimony was the 
product of a judgment call on the 
advisability of the new practice. In 
so holding, the court narrowed the 
impeachment exception and 
strictly limited the feasibility 
exception in the medical 
malpractice context. 
Eugene Tuer ("Tuer") was 
admitted to St. Joseph's Hospital 
on October 30, 1992, after 
complaining of chest pains. Tuer 
was scheduled to have coronary 
artery bypass graft ("CABG") 
surgery on November 2, 1992 at 
9:00 a.m. Drs. McDonald and 
Brawley ("Defendants") were the 
scheduled surgeons for Tuer's 
operation. After further complaints 
of chest pain, Tuer's cardiologist 
prescribed Heparin, an anti-
coagulant, to stabilize his heart 
condition. In accordance with 
hospital protocol, Tuer stopped 
receiving Heparin at 5:30 a.m. on 
the morning of the surgery. 
During trial, Dr. McDonald 
testified that the purpose of 
discontinuing Heparin three to four 
hours before surgery was to allow 
the blood to coagulate. He 
explained that during the first stage 
of CABG surgery, the jugular vein 
is punctured and there is an 
inherent 5-10% risk of an 
inadvertent puncture of the carotid 
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artery. Dr. McDonald stated that it 
was critical for patients not to have 
Heparin in their blood prior to 
surgery because a puncture of the 
carotid artery could cause a 
serious bleeding problem. 
The surgeons delayed Tuer's 
surgery to attend to another patient 
in critical condition. They decided 
not to provide Heparin to Tuer 
during the period of delay. Tuer 
went into cardiac arrest at 1 :00 
p.m. After seven hours of surgery 
and other resuscitation efforts, 
Tuer died. Following his death, the 
defendants changed their 
procedure for discontinuing 
Heparin for patients with unstable 
angina, Tuer's condition. Under 
the new protocol, patients receive 
Heparin until they go into surgery. 
At trial in the Circuit Court of 
Maryland for Baltimore County, 
Mary Tuer ("Plaintiff'), the 
surviving spouse of Tuer, made 
two efforts to introduce the 
defendants change in protocol into 
evidence through the adverse 
witness testimony of Dr. 
McDonald. First, she sought to 
use the new protocol to prove the 
feasibility of her husband surviving 
CABG surgery with Heparin in his 
blood. Defense counsel's 
objection to this line of questioning 
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was sustained by the court, but Dr. 
McDonald stated that he believed 
it would have been unsafe to 
restart the Heparin during the 
delay. Plaintiff then attempted to 
use the new protocol to impeach 
Dr. McDonald's statement. The 
court rejected the plaintiffs 
impeachment argument and 
entered judgment for the 
defendants. The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the 
trial court's decision. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari to review the trial court's 
exclusion of the evidence. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by examining the 
development of Maryland law on 
the admissibility of subsequent 
remedial measures before the 
adoption of Maryland Rule 5-407. 
Tuer, 347 Md. at 516,701 A.2d at 
1105. Giving the common law 
reasoning behind the exclusion of 
later adopted measures, the court 
stated that introduction of latter 
taken measures places an unjust 
interpretation on the defendant's 
actions and offers an incentive for 
continued negligence. Id. at 517, 
701 A.2d at 11 06 (citing Columbia 
v. Hawthome, 144 U.S. 202 
(1892». Under Columbia, 
evidence of a subsequent remedial 
measure was excluded as an 
admission of liability or proof of 
negligence. Id. at 518-21, 701 
A.2d at 1106-08. Maryland courts 
followed the Supreme Court rule 
laid out in Columbia, but an 
exception to the exclusionary rule 
developed. Id. at 518,701 A.2d at 
1106. 
The court noted that evidence 
became admissible to show that 
the defendants departed from the 
proper standard of care. Id. at 
520, 701 A.2d at 1107 (citing 
28.2 U. Bait LF.J. 37 
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Blanco v. J.e. Penny, 251 Md. 
707, 248 A.2d 645 (1968». In 
Blanco, the plaintiff introduced 
evidence of the defendant placing 
decals on plate glass panels after 
the plaintiff sustained an injury by 
walking into the glass panel. Id. 
The evidence was admitted, not as 
an admission of negligence, but to 
show a deviation from the proper 
standard of care due at the time of 
the injury. Id. 
Turning to an analysis of the 
drafting of Maryland Rule 5-407, 
the court offered the text of the 
Maryland statute and stated that 
the Rules Committee 
recommended the adoption of the 
substance and interpretation of the 
Federal Rule of Evidence 407. Id. 
at 521, 701 A.2d. at 1108. In 
endorsing the new rule, the 
Committee made it clear that the 
standard of care exception was not 
part of the rule. Id. at 522, 701 
A.2d at 1108. The two 
justifications for excluding the 
exception were: 1) that subsequent 
changes are equally compatible 
with an accidental injury or 
contributory negligence; and 2) the 
public policy of encouraging 
individuals to add safety measures 
whenever possible. Id. (citing 
Rules of Evidence for United 
States Courts and Magistrates, 56 
F.R.D. 183,225-226 (1973». The 
Maryland Rules Committee 
believed the standard of care 
exception would essentially 
become the rule and did not add it 
to the list of exceptions. Id at 522, 
701 A.2d at 1108. 
Next, the court reviewed 
Plaintiffs arguments for admission 
of the change in protocol into 
evidence. Id. at 524,701 A.2d at 
1109. Plaintiffs first contention 
was that Dr. McDonald's testimony 
challenged the feasibility of the 
new protocol. Id. at 524, 701 A.2d 
at 1109. Maryland Rule 5-407(b) 
28.2 U. Bait. LF.J. 38 
permits evidence of a subsequent 
remedial measure when it is 
introduced to prove the feasibility 
of the change, but only if the 
defendant disputes the feasibility. 
Id. A problem arises when the 
defendant offers an explanation for 
not making a change earlier and 
the plaintiff asserts that the 
explanation is tantamount to a 
feasibility challenge. Id. at 527, 
701 A.2d at 1111. The court noted 
that the issue was whether Dr. 
McDonald's judgment call 
controverted the feasibility of the 
change in protocol. Id. at 528, 
701 A.2d at 1111. 
Under normal circumstances, 
Dr. McDonald's statement that he 
believed restarting the Heparin 
would be unsafe, would ordinarily 
suffice as a challenge to the 
feasibility of the measure. Id. 
However, the court determined 
that in a medical context the 
standard is different. Id. The 
court characterized Dr. McDonald's 
testimony as the product of a 
balancing test between that which 
was medically possible and that 
which was advisable under the 
current circumstances. Id. at 529, 
701 A.2d at 1112. Observing that 
"virtually anything can physically be 
done to the human body," the court 
determined that Dr. McDonald was 
merely stating that which was 
medically not advisable, but still 
feasible. Id. at 528-29, 701 A.2d 
at 1111-1112. 
Next, the court addressed 
Plaintiffs effort to fit the change in 
protocol into the impeachment 
exception under Maryland Rule 5-
407(b). Id. at 529, 701 A.2d at 
1112. The prevailing view is that 
the impeachment exception must 
be read narrowly. Id. Proposing 
examples of simple defendant 
statements that could logically be 
impeached with a subsequent 
measure, the court asserted that 
subsequent remedial measure 
evidence is usually not permitted 
to show a minor discrepancy in the 
defendant's testimony. Id. at 530, 
701 A.2d 1112. Although a 
contradiction can always be 
illustrated, the issue is the nature 
of the contradiction. Id. While 
rejecting the plaintiffs claim, the 
court reasoned that the hospital's 
change in protocol after Tuer's 
death does not suggest that the 
defendant's believed they acted 
inappropriately. Id. at 532, 701 
A.2d at 1113. The. court 
concluded by stressing that the 
kind of reevaluation that occurred 
in this case was precisely the 
process that Maryland Rule 5-407 
was designed to promote and 
protect. Id. 
In Tuer, the court of appeals 
held that a doctor's testimony, 
regarding the imprudence of the 
use of a different medical 
procedure, was not a challenge to 
the feasibility of that procedure. 
Additionally, the court ruled that 
the doctor's testimony regarding 
the dangers inherent in the new 
procedure did not open the door to 
impeach the testimony. These 
rulings prevented the plaintiff from 
introducing the change in protocol 
as an exception to the general bar 
against admission of subsequent 
remedial measures. The court's 
holding created a safe haven for 
medical professionals in 
malpractice cases. Under Tuer, 
medical professionals can admit 
the alternate procedure was 
feasible, but, in their opinion not 
advisable. Standing on the new 
middle ground, medical 
malpractice defendants will be 
afforded the protection of Maryland 
Rule 5-407(a). Under Tuer, the 
testimony will be deemed a 
judgment call, not a challenge to 
feasibility. 
